US 1st Air Force

v.1.0 September 30, 2001

Ravi Rikhye

This article is based on open source USAF websites.

The US 1st Air Force is among the four oldest numbered air forces. Originally activated in World War II for air defense of the Northeast, it was activated for the fourth time in 1985. Its HQ is at Tyndall AFB, FL, and since 1997 has been primarily composed of US Air National Guard units, which carry 90% of the continental air defense burden from 26 US air bases. It is the US component of NORAD, a command operated jointly with Canada.

The 1st Air Force is commanded by a major general, and controls three Air Defense Sectors, each commanded by a colonel.

It has ten dedicated Air National Guard fighter squadrons, with 150 aircraft, all F-15 and F-16. By contrast, in its peak year of 1958, NORAD had 2600 fighter interceptors, including RCAF aircraft. Its mission can be supplemented by regular fighter squadrons. Till September 11, 2001, a significant part of 1st Air Force's work consisted of supporting air defense operations overseas. Each fighter squadron is part of a fighter wing, and generally the wing is identified, not the squadron.

Unit

State

Aircraft

102 TFW

MA

F-15

119 TFW

ND

F-16ADS

120 TFW

MT

F-16

125 TFW

FL

F-15

142 TFW

OR

F-15

144 TFW

CA

F-16

147 TFW

TX

F-16

148 TFW

MI

F-16ADS

158 TFW

VT

F-16

178 TFW

OH

F-16

Air National Guard squadrons not assigned to 1st Air Force can be used as required. For example, till the 119 TFW from Fargo, ND took over responsibility for the Washington DC region after deploying to Langley AFB, VA, the 113 TFW (F-16) at Andrews AFB, MD, stood down from the mission. We may reasonably assume that Langley AFB's famous tenant, the 1st Fighter Wing ("FF") with F-15s, a regular unit, has either deployed overseas or is on-call, and so is not available for the air defense mission.

At the present time, combat air patrols are being flown intermittently from 1st Air Force bases. To keep an element of two F-16s airborne requires a squadron, the pilots will have to fly 80-100 hours a month and each aircraft, including squadron reserves, will rack up over 1000 hours a year. This is an unsustainable tempo. The news media say that patrols are continuous over New York and Washington; this may or may not be true, but in any event is not a state of affairs that can continue for much longer. New York, at least, has the added benefit of two aircraft carriers in addition to its assigned USAF fighters. The John F. Kennedy and USS George Washington will presumably also be operating under 1st Air Force. Insofar as potential terrorists have no way of knowing when fighters are up, intermittent patrols are a sufficient deterrent in themselves.

According to the media, authority has now been delegated to local commanders. Normally, 15 minutes are required to scramble an element that is standing alert. Add to that time required to intercept, and we are looking at 20-30 minutes. In the September 11 attacks, that probably would have sufficed to intercept diverted aircraft: the hijackers appear to have waited for some time before making their moves. For example, one flight was over the Midwest before it was commandeered. In the future, this much time may be not be available, and junior commanders may have to give the kill order.

To shoot down an enemy civilian plane is one thing; to shoot down your own country's civilian aircraft puts an unprecedented psychological burden on all in the command chain, and particularly on the intercepting pilots. This is not a situation that can be maintained indefinitely, particularly since - inevitably - there will be close calls and misunderstandings even if no further suicide hijackings take place, with the consequent damage to nerves. Further, terrorists may well accept being forced to kill merely themselves and the passengers on an aircraft; if so, a hijacker in control of an aircraft will not be deterred by interception, and will have to be shot down. Four hundred passengers on a 747 may make an acceptable substitute if more lucrative targets are unattainable. For these reasons we sincerely hope the United States and the aviation world focus on counter-hijacking measures other than interception, and does so expeditiously.

 

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All content © 2001 Ravi Rikhye. Reproduction in any form prohibited without express permission.